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EDITORIAL
In a previous QHW Editorial (Hallberg, 2006) the
importance of not following slavishly any rigid step-
by-step ‘‘method’’ was emphasized. Where the goal
is to illuminate individuals’ sometimes enigmatic
lifeworlds, thereby showing how health and well-
being can be promoted, supported and restored,
no inflexible and formulaic research technique is
adequate. Research must be carried out by an open,
lifeworld-sensitive approach where there is scope for
genuinely empathic sensibility. Techniques must be
chosen that are appropriate for the phenomenon
under investigation. The research approach must be
built on a strong foundation of ontology, epistemol-
ogy and methodology. Of course, there are several
human science research approaches that meet these
criteria. Phenomenology is an example of such an
approach.
Phenomenological philosophy gives to research a
thorough understanding of what knowledge is, what
proposed knowledge needs in order to be valid, and
how a researcher gets access to such knowledge.
Phenomenological research is interested in human
meaning, e.g. the meaning of health, illness and
well-being.
The research may on the one hand have a
hermeneutical flavour, regarding the data as ‘‘text’’
for interpretation (there is a strong emphasis on the
impact of language). Therefore, although phenom-
enological research is always close to experience, the
hermeneutical researchers see themselves as having a
heavy task*that of making sense of experience. It
may be that external sources such as previously
published research findings or existing theories are
brought into the analysis. In such analyses the
findings are summed up in a ‘‘comprehensive under-
standing’’ or a ‘‘main interpretation’’, where the
phenomenon is described in a way that includes the
original empirical as well as external data sources.
If the research on the other hand is focused
strongly on the experience as it is expressed in
empirical data it is a ‘‘descriptive analysis’’. Though
the researcher obviously has a part to play in the
description of experience, it is always emphasised
that the description is of the research participant’s
experience and the researcher is a kind of midwife in
bringing the experience to the light of day. Results
of such analysis are mainly presented as a ‘‘general
structure’’, in which the essential meanings of
the phenomenon as well as its other constituting
meanings are described.
No doubt great care is needed in coming to a good
description of the lifeworld and human meaning*
bracketing presuppositions and ‘‘bridling’’ the forth-
coming understanding so as to focus purely on the
experience of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, the
process of description is not so very controversial*
maybe because something like it is shared by other
approaches. Nevertheless, the idea of presenting a
general structure, and in particular the idea that the
researcher can arrive at essential meanings, is very
much under debate. Consequently, we want to
illuminate some of the characteristics of phenomen-
ological empirical analysis in which the goal is a
general structure.
Basically, all phenomenological research begins in
the lifeworld, e.g. individuals’ experiences of health
or illness. However, some studies which announce
themselves as phenomenological, do not go much
further than listing some themes common to the
research participants’ accounts of their experience.
In these instances, the work ought to be seen as
‘‘thematic analysis’’ rather than phenomenological
research, despite having a foundation in the careful
description of experience.
In truly phenomenological research, the individual
instances of experience are reflectively worked on by
the researcher, who may, for example, look for
aspects of an experience, which*though they might
not have been explicitly mentioned in interviews*
are necessary components of that experience. In
such analysis the deeper-lying meanings must be
illuminated and not least must the relationships
between the meanings, i.e. the pattern of meanings,
be explicated (Dahlberg, 2006). The process of
coming to an essential description of a phenomenon,
therefore, involves ‘‘free imaginative variation’’. The
aim is to reach a statement of the phenomenon
which is sufficiently clear for anyone who knows the
general, essential structure of the experience to be
able to say, when a new instance occurs, whether it is
an instance of that very phenomenon or not. In this
sense, the essence provides a phenomenological
equivalent of generalizability.
The description of a general structure includes the
essential meanings but it may also be right to present
some particularities. To give a simple example, an
essential meaning of ‘‘table’’ is its capability of
offering a hard surface on a certain level above the
floor. But in order to understand the table phenom-
enon it could be of importance to also present some
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made of oak wood, which is a part of a classic dinner
table set, while there are other tables made of plastic,
e.g. good for outdoor use. The first described mean-
ing is essential; without it an entity is not a table.
Additionally, whether the table is of wood or plastic
could be of aesthetic value-but is not an essential
meaning; the material does not affect its ‘‘tableness’’
(Dahlberg, Dahlberg & Nystro ¨m, 2008). Further,
according to Merleau-Ponty (1995) all meanings are
infinite and expanding. Consequently, a general
description or an essence is never complete.
Let us consider as an example, the phenomenon
‘‘participation’’. The essential description is very
likely to be incomplete (e.g. we may have made all
sorts of cultural assumptions which would have to be
revised if we were to apply the idea to Chinese
culture). Nevertheless, the description of the essence
of participation should be good enough to let us see
(for example) what the necessary conditions are for
patient participation in heath care. On the basis of
these lifeworld conditions we could helpfully say that
if such-and-such a feature were absent in an actual
patient-professional relationship, then patient parti-
cipation would not occur.
A paper describing the essence of participation
(Ashworth, 1977) concluded that among the essen-
tial characteristics of this phenomenon were:
. Attunement to the others’‘ ‘ stock of knowledge
at hand’’.
. Emotional and motivational attunement to the
group’s concerns.
. Taking for granted (and implicitly assuming the
others take it for granted) that one can con-
tribute worthily.
. Being able to assume that one’s identity is not
under threat.
The paper mentions a lot of variants*especially
ways in which participation breaks down. One
example is being ‘‘cold shouldered’’, where one is
very openly made to feel an outsider, another is the
feeling that one is being merely ‘‘humoured’’ rather
than having one’s views considered respectfully.
However, these do not indicate necessary compo-
nents of (non-)participation.
The four essential components of participation are
generalizable. This is shown by the fact that it was
indeed possible, on the basis of this essential
structure, to develop detailed critical accounts of
the conditions of patient participation (Ashworth,
Longmate & Morrison, 1992). Similarly discussion
of the technique of participant observation (Ash-
worth, 1995) was illuminated by the essential
structure, and there is even an unpublished study
for a voluntary organisation of the lack of member
engagement in decision-making.
The debate sometimes seems to be between a
Husserlian understanding on the one hand and a
Heideggerian one on the other. Being part of the
same tradition, the two philosophers sometimes
emphasise different ideas but these differences do
not have to be a problem for human science
researchers of today. However, we see*from our
viewpoint as members of editorial boards and by
examining other research papers*people seemingly
wanting to split phenomenology into two (or more)
separate paths, often on the basis of misunderstand-
ings of the philosophy. One such misunderstanding
related to the topic of this Editorial is that the idea of
essences is related to ‘‘essentialism’’, which is wrong.
If one thing is true of phenomenology, it is that it
overcomes dichotomies such as materialism*ideal-
ism, or essentialism*constructivism. The main idea
of the lifeworld negates all such attempts. The
lifeworld is not material or ideal, if anything it is
both at the same time. Better, the lifeworld is in-
between these (Western) constructions of the world
and can be said to intertwine the different aspects of
the world. For example, with a phenomenological
lifeworld approach we can see how patients’ suffer-
ing can be related to biology but that at the same
time we need to attend to the experiential side of the
illness, if we want to support well-being.
The skilful and empathic use of such approaches as
phenomenology to the situations with which this
journal is concerned will generate research papers
which allow readers, and through them students and
patients, to grasp again the meaning of their and
others lifeworlds. In a sense, we are already familiar
with the important, even fateful, experiences in the
realm of health and well-being, but they are for the
most part overlain with theory and presuppositions
and we have lost the lively contact with these aspects
ofhumanreality.Phenomenologically-basedresearch
brings us back to the human lifeworld, and the
meaning of such-and-such an experience within it.
Karin Dahlberg
Co-Editor
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